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Long distance passenger mobility is experiencing a huge structural change in France and 
Germany. Based on Internet technology and customer-oriented services, new entrants in 
interurban coach services are diversifying the options for the travelers and have been 
very successful. This market has been deregulated in 2013 in Germany and 2015 in 
France. New actors are not only challenging rail operators in France and Germany, but 
also BlaBlaCar, the world leader in ridesharing and sometimes low cost airlines.  
Long distance coach players have also experienced in 2019 a concentration of actors: 
Flixbus, the leader with a market share in Germany of 95% has bought the French 
outsider Eurolines/Isilines. Eurolines/Isilines (Transdev Group) was the dominant 
operator before deregulation but had not succeeded to become a leader. Ouibus, which 
is a subsidiary of SNCF-the challenger of Flixbus in France, experienced high losses in 
operating, which was backed by public fund and debt, was sold to BlaBlaCar. Ouibus 
changed its name in BlaBlaBus - and is now becoming the French challenger in coach 
and ride-sharing operation.  
Flixbus and BlaBlaBus are now moving on the European market: the aim of our paper is 
to analyze the development strategies of these coach services leaders in France and 
Germany in a European perspective. What will be the balance? Which new services will 
emerge? 
 
 1 The intercity bus market in France 
 
The French mobility market is highly dynamic: between 2012 and 2017, the population has 
grown with an annual rhythm of 0,4% but mobility of passenger transport has increased by 
1,2% (Guihery,Tedeschi, 2019). The following table is showing the French transport 
passenger market: individual mobility is representing 80 % of the passenger market. From 
the long-distance public passenger market, coach is representing 2,7 billion passenger.km, 
increasing rapidly (+19,2 % in 2018 compared to 2017), it means 9 million passengers in 
2018. Railway mode is still leading with 53 % of all public transport.  
 
Table 1 National passenger transport in France – 2018 and trend  since 2013 
 
2018 (en billion 
pass.km) 
In % 
 
Trend 2018/2013 
Individual mobility 757,1                          80 % +1,2 
Long distance public 
transport 
123,9 100 %  
Road : coaches (1) 43,9 35 % 0,2 
From this  interurban 
coaches 
2,7 2,2%  
From this occasional in 
foreign coaches 
6,6 5,3% -1,3 
Rail : HST 58,6 47 % 1,3 
Rail : Interurban train 
(no HSR) 
5,5 4,5% 
-7,5 % 
challenged by 
coaches today 
Air transport (2) 15,9 13% 1,9 
Public transport – 
short distance 
58,4 100%  
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Road : buses and 
tramways 
14,6 25 % 3,1 
 Ile-de-France 6 10% 3,6 
outside Ile-de-France 8,5 15% 2,8 
Rail : regional trains 13,8 24% -0,1 
Rail : regional trains in 
Ile-de-France 
19,2 33% 1,1 
Tubes 10,8 19% 1,4 
Ile–de–France 8,1  1,3 
Outside Ile–de-France 2,7  1,6 
 
Source: Les comptes transport de la nation 2018, August 2019, p. 139 
Notes: (1): occasional transport, regular (SNCF Coaches), school and staff coaches; (2): national 
metropolitan flights only.  
 
Concerning the coaches, the national agency in charge of regulation, ARAFER, is collecting 
all the data on the national market (ARAFER, 2019). Firms can offer intercity bus services 
nearly as they want, with the exception when these services are challenging local and 
regional public transport within a distance of 50 km (Germany) and 100 km (France) from the 
main city. The main leaders on the market – FlixBus and now BlaBlaBus – own no coaches 
and are subcontracting with coach companies that fulfill the requirements regarding safety, 
performance and professional competence. As in Germany, the French intercity coach 
market was a niche market before deregulation and, at the same time, the state-owned 
intercity railway company (SNCF). Similarly, DB in Germany had a monopoly in rail 
passenger transport. Today, the situation has entirely changed and rail incumbents are facing 
both intermodal competition (ride-sharing, long distance coach, low costs airlines) and 
intramodal competition (Flixtrain in Germany starting on the rail market and Thello but 
primarily Trenitalia entering France in June 2020). 
Since the beginning of operation (August 2015 in France and 2013 in Germany), 23 million 
passengers have travelled with coaches in France (2,3 million in the first quarter of 2019), 
which means an increase by 26 % in comparison with the first quarter of 2018 and 4% 
increase since the last quarter of 2018. Similar to Germany, the market is slowly reaching a 
threshold and is season oriented (for instance, 234 cities are connected in the first quarter 
2019, it means 11 % less than the last quarter of 2018). The load factor is 59,8% and is 
continuously increasing for two years. Due to this result, the profitability is increasing slowly 
after the losses incurred by the operators in the years before. The income by coach.km is 
increasing by 7 % in 2018 and is reaching 0,97 €. The revenue per pass.km remains low:  
approximately 3,7€ for 100 pass.km. As we will see later, competitive pressure is very strong 
on this market. The average travel distance is 284 km in the first quarter of 2019. 
Eight operators are referenced in the first quarter of 2019, but in mid-2019, the situation is 
becoming very clear with two main actors: Ouibus is integrated (1st July 2019) with the leader 
of ride-sharing BlaBlaCar. Ouibus changed its name to BlaBlaBus, the new European actor. 
Eurolines / Isilines joins Flixbus in May 2019, which is becoming the European leader ahead 
of its challengers. Flixbus in France is reinforcing his service. At present, Flixbus reaches 78 
% of the cities in France and 70 % of the relations, a record since 2015. What will be the 
reaction of the new actor BlaBlaBus?  
One of the main topics of discussions in France is the impact of competition on public 
services of regional railway transport (TER) and regional coach transport that are financed 
and managed by the Regions. The new liberalization law of coach transport has implemented 
a safeguard for regional public transport. The ARAFER is strictly controlling this issue: at this 
time (2017), only 4% of new coach services are in competition with subsidized public regional 
rail services.  Less than 100 lines were taken to arbitrage Court of ARAFER by the Regions 
that considered these new services as an unfair competition to public service. 85% of the 
lines analyzed were considered as fair and could be opened.  
The success of ride-sharing services and coach operations in France, like in Germany, is 
celebrating the comeback of road in the modal split after years and years of state support to 
the rail company. Even if the two challengers could be slower in travel time than rail, they 
answer to the expectations of passengers: door to door services, cheaper than rail prices, 
high quality of service (WIFI). Some researches in France show that 17 % of the traffic are 
induced traffic, it leans new motility because of these new cheap services. 
 
2 The intercity coach market in Germany 
The German intercity bus market was deregulated in January 2013 and is totally changing 
the shape of the long-distance market in Germany because the DB is not the only allowed 
operator in long distance passenger market: intermodal competition is becoming stronger 
(coach – rail – air) but also since mid-2018 with newcomer Flixtrain (open access) on the 
German rail network. Coach companies are allowed to offer intercity bus services, if the 
company fulfils the subjective requirements regarding safety, performance and professional 
competence and if the company is registered in Germany (Personenbeförderungsgesetz 
(PBefG), 2013, §13(1), Gremm, Guihery, 2017). As expressed before, subsidized regional 
railway and public transport system are protected in a radius around the coach station where 
the service is started (50 km or a minimum regional railway travel time of 60 minutes 
(Personenbeförderungsgesetz (PBefG), 2013, §42a, Gremm, Guihery, 2017).  
 
The German coach market is a very dynamic market with 23,1 million passengers carried 
in 2018 (Figure 1), stable since 2016 (8,2 million in 2013, 16 million in 2015). It means 6,7 
billion passenger.km in 2018. In comparison, 149 million passengers are using the railway in 
2018, increasing since 2015 (138 million in 2016, 142 in 2017 and 149 in 2018). Then the 
market share of coach transport is slowly declining since 2015 (15%) to 14,3 % in 2016, 2017 
and 13,4 % in 2018. Berlin (1672 departures every week in 2017), Frankfurt (1007), Hamburg 
(884), Cologne (853) and Munich (803) are the five main connected cities. 2945 companies 
are registered for long distance services but only 65 offer a regular coach service (2016). But 
Flixbus (Flixmobility GmbH - Figure 2) is reaching 95 % of the market shares. 50 % of the 
passengers are below 34 years old. Aim of trip is 40 % private purposes, 23 % for holidays 
and 23 % for tourism. Cheap tickets and comfort in coach, Wi-Fi available, are largely 
approved by the users. 
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Figure 1 Number of rail and coach passengers in Germany 
 
Source: Statista, 2019 
 
In 2017 in Europe, 40 million passengers (30 million in 2016) have travelled with Flixbus 
(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 6.03.3018). Load factor is around 60% (Stuttgarter Zeitung, 
20.12.2017): increasing the load factor is one of the key factors of the strategy of Flixbus to 
reach profitability1 on this market in Germany but also in France. 
 
 
Figure 2 Structure of Capital of Flixbus 
 
Source: Statista, 2019 
 
After deregulation, many bus companies such as Postbus, FlixBus, MeinFernbus or 
Megabus have entered the German interurban bus market. Since January 2015, the number 
of independent players has been reduced significantly due to a process of consolidation 
(Gremm, Guihery, 2017). The two biggest bus companies, FlixBus and MeinFernbus, 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 Break-even point of Flixbus Germany is around 67 % load factor (http://www.manager-
magazin.de/magazin/artikel/fernbusmarkt-flixbus-der-monopolist-a-1142889-2.html) 
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announced a merger in January, 2015. In 2016, FlixBus bought the German intercity bus 
company of Megabus and Postbus. 
Since deregulation in 2013, the number of intercity bus lines increased from 62 lines in the 
first quarter of 2013 to 328 lines in the fourth quarter of 2015 (Gremm, Guihery, 2017) and 
287 lines in the third quarter 2018. In the course of consolidation, the number of lines has 
then been reduced (see Figure 3).   
 
 Figure 3 Number of intercity bus lines in Germany 
 
Source: Statista, 2019 
 
This summer 2019, the DeinBus.de has announced insolvency (50 drivers for 56 
employees) and is trying to keep his activities alive. Many reasons explain this situation: 
insolvency from a partner first but the key factor is the competitive pressure from Flixbus, 
leader of the market. This new insolvency is putting a new name on a long list of the 
companies which have abandoned the German market: Megabus, The Post, German post 
and the ADAC. It would be interesting to see if Blablabus would succeed in challenging 
Flixbus.  
 
3 Competition BlaBlaBus - Flixbus: which balance on the European 
market?   
Long distance coach players in France and Germany has experienced in 2019 a 
concentration of actors: Flixbus, the leader with a market share in Germany of 95 %, has 
bought the French outsider Eurolines/Isilines. Eurolines/Isilines (Transdev Group), who was 
the dominant operator in Europe before deregulation. Ouibus, subsidiary of SNCF-challenger 
of Flixbus in France, was sold to BlaBlaCar, which changed its name in BlaBlaBus and is 
now becoming the French leader in coach and ride-sharing operation and is moving rapidly 
on the European market.  
 
3.1 On Flixbus Strategy 
 
Concerning Flixbus, it is difficult to get some information: The Federal Administration of 
Germany is officially expressing this fact in its 2017 report2 (BAG, report on long distance 
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coach, 2017, p. 362). In Table 2 , we sum up some official data from official financial statement 
monitoring (Bundesanzeiger). In particular, it appears that Flixbus is losing money in France 
and Italy in 2015 and 2016, but not any more in 2017 in Italy. We have to be very careful with 
these results because some financial arrangement could occur, for instance putting costs to 
the local companies and more revenues to the mother company in Germany (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2 Financial and staff data on Flixbus  in Europe 
  2015 2016 2017 
  
Employe
es 
Profit / 
Losses  
x 1 000 
Employees 
Profit / 
Losses  
x 1 000 
Employees 
Profit / 
Losses  
x 1 000 
France 16 -2 355 € 36 -9 438 €  ? ? 
Italy 15 -2 447 € 31 
-4 854 € 
(1) 
 ? 
 + 1 432 
€ (1) 
TURNOVE
R: 
Germany 
and 
TOTAL 
(Europe) 
562 
Turnover 
foreign:  
25 546   
Turn. 
Germany
. : 179 
972       
Total :  
215 286 
748 
Turnover 
foreign:  
131 000        
Turnover 
Germany
. : 197 
796              
Total :  
352 000 
 With now a quasi-
monopoly in 
Germany, the 
company is 
expecting positive 
financial results for 
2017 and 2018. 
 
Turnover 
2017 :  
400 000 
(Press) 
Source: https://www.bundesanzeiger.de/ebanzwww/wexsservlet; own calculations; (1) : Italy : 
Turnover Flixbus Italy in 2016 : 29 million € ; 2017 : 67,1 million €  (source : consodata.it and A. 
Bergantino). 
 
Flixbus in Europe is now operating 200 000 relations, 1400 destinations in 26 countries. At 
this time, the financial legal information available are the following:  
  
2016: negative cash flow of business: -3.496.000 € (in 2015: -24.650.000 €). 
2016: negative results (“Konzernjahresfehlbetrag”): - 53.989.000 (2015: - 31.475.000) 
 
In terms of competition, the strategy of FlixBus is to target many destinations in a diversified 
supply: in France, 56 cities are connected solely with FlixBus and 2/3 of all destinations are 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 No data available : „Für die  FlixMobility  GmbH (Flixbus),  die  Berlin  Linien  Bus  GmbH  sowie die  Deutsche  Post 
Mobility  GmbH  (Postbus)  liegen  derzeit  auf  Jahresabschlussbasis  keine  Daten  zur  Ertragslage vor” (BAG Report in 
Long Distance Coach, 2017, p. 36). 
 
reached by FlixBus (141 cities meaning 69 % of all destinations). BlaBlaCar – Ouibus before 
- seems to be more focused on the main lines with offering the mostly daily departures.  
In Germany, one of the success of Flixbus is to offer a network accessibility based on long 
distance passenger coach to middle size cities, which have been put aside from DB networks. 
Some relation (Dresden – Berlin3) are very competitive in term of transport time and can be 
faster than by train on certain period of time.  
One of the main strategies of Flixbus is to offer a door to door strategy: the company has 
signed an agreement with UBER in Germany in march 2019 (4 cities in Germany) and in 
France for 10 French cities: Paris, Marseille, Lyon, Lille, Toulouse, Nice, Nantes, Montpellier, 
Strasbourg, Bordeaux, Rennes, Aix-en-Provence with some advantages:  
 
 Flixbus is offering to UBER customers a voucher of 10% off for a travel with Flixbus 
all over his European network (2 000 destinations, 27 countries)4.  
 UBER gives 10€ voucher for Flixbus passengers using for the first time UBER. 
 
With UBER, Flixbus is starting maybe an interlining strategy. The next step could be a 
code-sharing integration of both data systems. 
The company is expanding rapidly at international level: Flixbus started in USA to compete 
with Greyhound in June 2019. At the end of August 2019, Flixbus has announced launching 
services in Turkey after owning Kamil Koc. Company, one of the leading companies in Turkey 
connecting 61 cities and carrying 20 million passengers in 2018. The Kamil Koc. Network will 
be integrated in the Flixbus network (Der Spiegel, 2019).  
 
As a reaction to the BlaBlaBus operation in Europe, Flixbus has announced in the mid of 
2019 the launch of his own ride-sharing services. In a short term’s perspective, the European 
market will be shared among two large and innovative operators, which should be positive 
for the customers and the services proposed.   
 
3.2 On BlaBlaBus strategy 
 
 
Blablabus is now operating in Germany since July 2019 under the supervision of Comutu, 
the subsidiary of BlaBlaCar in Germany. The BlaBlaBus coaches use the orange color that 
highly differentiate them from Flixbus operating in green. The strategy of BlaBlabus is to start 
operation with very low prices, starting from 99 Cent (FAZ, 28.08.2019). The Journalist from 
FAZ is talking from “Kampfpreisen” (combat’s price) or “Kennenlernpreise” (discovery’s 
prices) in the wording of BlaBlaBus, which comes back to the strategy observed by the 
famous German Economist Walter Eucken in her 1914 PhD (Eucken, 1914). He observed 
that during the expansion of maritime transport at the beginning of the century, large and 
known shippers organized “Kampfschiffe” (combat vessels) with very low shipping price to 
remove services from newcomer on this dynamic maritime freight market (Guihery, 2013).  
After two months of operation, BlaBlaBlus is responsible for 70 % of load factor in Germany, 
the key market of Flixbus. BlaBlaBus is reaching 30 destinations in Germany, mainly the 
largest cities. BlaBlaBus is planning to have 40 destinations at the end of 2019. All over 
Europe, BlaBlaBus is reaching 400 stops in comparison with Flixbus that offers 2000 
destinations with a 95% market share in Germany.   
The business model of BlaBlabus is same as that of Flixbus: contracting with private coach 
operators that manage both drivers and coach operation and provide high quality of service 
(WIFI, USB Plug-in, Toilet, Air conditioning).  
The strategy of BlaBlaBus is quite different from Flixbus: the French company does not 
want to enter the Railway market in comparison with Flixbus which has launched Flixtrain 
services. The intermodal expansion of Flixbus is a challenge because a possible lack of 
quality of service in the new segment of market could have an impact on the “milk cow”, it 
means the coach market for Flixbus. BlaBlaBus wants first to operate on the main relations 
                                                                                                                                                             
3 One of the most successful lines: 60 relations every day in 2016 (https://www.wiwo.de/unternehmen/dienstleister/flixbus-
wachstum-vor-profit/14680498-3.html).  
4 https://go.flixbus.fr/uber-partenariat/  
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between the main cities of the European Union, which allows rapidly to have revenues for 
further operations. Previous challengers that have retreated from the German market have 
focused on a larger scale with medium cities, which has led to low profitability and then 
losses. BlaBlaBus will try to increase the loading factor by selling the lowest prices on the 
market.  
The aim of the business strategy of BlaBlaBus is trying to connect its core business of ride-
sharing BlablaCar with an extension to the coach market.  The idea is a ride-sharing drive 
with BlablaCar to the largest city then take a coach to the next destination and then maybe 
continuing to the final destination with BlaBlaCar. One of the problems is to connect the two 
platforms: the coach platform where time table are centralized and know ex ante and 
BlaBlaCar where contact between drivers and passengers are fully decentralized and are 
going on every time. 
The second challenge is to move towards a model of mobility management known as 
MAAS : “Mobility as a service”: a synergy with SNCF website of e-commerce, leader in 
France -  www.oui.sncf, formerly www.sncf-voyage.com - is still existing with BlaBlaCar and 
BlaBlaBus supply being integrated with the website. High-speed rail, which is deploying a 
low-cost service between the main cities of France (Ouigo), also appears on this website. 
The aim is to set up a transport supply combining long distance coach service on the main 
relations and ride-sharing for the last 200 and 300 km. The chairman of BlaBlaCar, Nicolas 
Brusson, is assessing the level of demand of 25 million passengers by combining ride-sharing 
and interurban coaches. Indeed, Oui.sncf is utilized by 16 million unique counts every month 
and can list 300 stops for BlaBlaBus in French cities, 300 HSR stations, 3000 regional trains 
stations, and then 30 000 meeting points from BlaBlaCar (Boudet, Les Echos, 2018). One of 
the main issues remains unanswered between BlaBlaCar and Rail monopolist SNCF: 
complementarity or canibalization?  
BlaBlabus is also benefiting from the fast expansion of Ouibus on international level, which 
means very shortly challenging Flixbus: Ouibus, now BlaBlaBus, teamed up with Alsa in 
Spain and Portugal, National Express in the UK, and Marino Bus in Italy to create Europe’s 
largest coach network, which implies serving 300 destinations in 10 countries (SNCF, Press 
release, 27.07.2018, p. 3). UK National Express is now teaming up with Alsa to gain an active 
participation in this strategy. One interesting point is the coming back to continental Europe 
of the worldwide leader National Express: the last financial statement of National Express is 
mentioning, “ALSA has recently established a joint venture – which also involves our UK 
coach business as well as Ouibus – to offer new international services across selected 
European countries. They have also submitted a bid with a local joint venture partner for a 
400-bus contract in Rabat, to consolidate their presence in Morocco (NationalExpress Group, 
2018, p. 25). After the disaster of Megabus (Stagecoach) in Germany and France – rapid 
expansion and fast retreat to sum up with high losses - the alliance between BlaBlaBus and 
National Express is particularly interesting and reveals its revival in Continental Europe. 
Probably, their main objective could be to challenge FlixBus. 
 
The German Press has explicitly observed this evolution of the European market towards 
more competition:  
 
“French are attacking Flixbus with a European alliance” (FAZ, C. Schubert, 19.12.2017)5.  
 
And the Chairman of the SNCF Group is supporting this strategy: “If Flixbus is thinking that 
she can dominate the market like in Germany, they will fail. There will ever be two players in 
the market6” (Guillaume Pepy, Chief SNCF – Ouibus).  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
5 „Franzosen greifen Flixbus mit europäischer Allianz an“ (FAZ, C. Schubert, 19.12.2017) : 
http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/unternehmen/franzosen-greifen-flixbus-mit-europaeischer-allianz-an-15348507.html  
6 „Wenn Flixbus glaubt, es könne den Markt wie in Deutschland dominieren, werden sie scheitern“. „Es wird immer zwei große 
Spieler im Markt geben.“(https://www.wiwo.de/unternehmen/dienstleister/flixbus-wachstum-vor-profit/14680498-3.html) 
3.3 Which balance on a European perspective 
  
 
One of the main criticisms facing this price battle between Flixbus and BlaBlabus is the 
impact of the revenue of the coach companies and then, maybe, the saving made on 
maintenance and driver wages. In mid-2019, a major Flixbus coach accident occured on 
motorway A9 near Leipzig that has highlighted the complex and very intensive operational 
process of Flixbus. In a report by the German Office for Freight Transport, the level of breach 
of the law on the regulation of travel and driving time observed in 2017 is relatively high for 
coach services: 12 % for 1346 control in coaches. The report is also mentioning the high level 
of illness among the drivers (Süddeusche Zeitung, 20.05.2019). Moreover, trade unions 
consider that only the most serious cases are registered. 
Flixbus has agreement with 300 subcontractors which become 74% of the transport 
revenues. Some German companies have cancelled partnerships with Flixbus, so East 
European and South European companies are now operating for Flixbus. Wage convention 
– the famous “tarifvertrag” in Germany, one of the basis of the German Social Economy 
model - are not considered in this sector. 7000 drivers are operating in 2000 Flixbus coaches.  
BlaBlaBus will face the same issue and we can question if some European regulation should 
be implemented pertaining to this? 
Strategies to reach the break-even point are now on the agenda of coach companies that 
are expressing this point of view in many public declarations and financial statements. Coach 
companies rely on a continuing growing market, looking for market segmentation (first class 
seats with reservation (Flixbus in Germany) options proposed within the main tickets). They 
also invest niche lines (ski resorts in winter for Flixbus) and develop hub and spoke strategies, 
for example from the Saint Exupéry Lyon Airport in France (BlaBlaBus). Sometimes, the 
coach companies avoid stopping in dedicated coach stations where some fees are applied. 
They also transfer some risk to subcontractors: new contracts impose incentives on 
performance on subcontractors and limit the mandatory financial contribution from the coach 
company to subcontractors. 
New mobility services experience today a rash adjustment in strategies. In long distance 
transport, Flixbus and BlablaBus are now entering a period of time of heavy competition, 
which can be positive for the travelers, in terms of quality of services and prices7. In urban 
mobility, the situation is worsening for car-sharing with a lack of profitability if this business: 
Mercedes-Benz (car2go) and BMW (DriveNow) have reorganized their service, they join with 
the new common ShareNow service, which is a sign of reduction of competition and look for 
an exit. Mazda is also reconsidering its joint venture with Deutsche Bahn and Lidl and will 
stop its car-sharing service. Citroen-Peugeot also resigned in Berlin after launching Multicity 
very early in 2012. The main reason seems to be the rediscovering of the principles of the 
common goods, which imply no respect or a misuse of private users!  
In the mobility world, now is the time for reshaping supply and looking for profitable markets.   
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